[Libertarian Forum, 1971]
“Revolution” has been defined, by all too many libertarians, as well as by most other people, as simply massive acts of direct violence.
But “revolution” is really the application of Aristotelian final causality to the process of social and political change, and should not be confused with throwing bricks or any other random acts of violence. But what does this mean?
It means that revolution, in contradistinction to evolution as an approach to social and political change, is truly goal directed, having as its end the ending of any current political-statist system, and the replacement of statism with a libertarian society.
Final causality is really not anything complex: it is the process of choosing and acting which results when the end one has established determines the means required to attain it. These means must be truly worthy of the end, or capable of attaining it, which means that they must be determined by reason, by thinking about the context in which one finds oneself and one’s political system, and deciding what would be the best possible way of attaining the end.
Does revolution involve violence? Not necessarily, but probably most likely it will, at least in its final stages.
What the libertarian must focus on is that such violence must always be defensive or retaliatory violence, not invasive, aggressive violence. It may be necessary in the final stages of any revolution because there always tend to be those in the “ruling class” who will not simply quit using aggression and intimidation voluntarily, and whom people must defend themselves against, peacefully if possible, violently if not.
What I want to call special attention to here is the fact that revolution is not merely any concrete violence against the state apparatus and the set of institutions and men who systematically use aggression to accomplish their ends.
Indeed, in many contexts such violence will be truly counter-revolutionary and unproductive of the end of liberty.
But violence should not therefore on that account alone be ruled out a priori as a means of dealing with the systematic coercion of the state.
To quote Murray N. Rothbard, in July of 1969,
Revolution is a mighty, complex, long-run process, a complicated movement with many vital parts and functions. It is the pamphleteer writing in his study, it is the journalist, the political club, the agitator, the organizer, the campus activist, the theoretician, the philanthropist. It is all this and much more. Each person and group has its part to play in this great complex movement.
What integrates all of these actions and functions? Very simply, the end of getting rid of the coercive apparatus of the state. If one believes in a “limited government,” then he must still admit that by his own standards what we have today is light-years from any such thing, and that therefore he too is in favor of getting rid of the coercive apparatus of the present state.
The point that I want to make, then, is a simple one. In answer to the oft-asked question of “when is it time for a revolution,” the real answer becomes — in view of the above — it is always time for revolution, whenever there is a state ruling over any people anywhere. Because, remember, revolution is not merely the acts of violence near the end of the road, when victory is almost won — it is each and every action which is taken to attain the final end of the abolition of the state.
The tactics and strategy will change from time to time and place to place, depending upon the concrete nature of the state which a movement is concerned with.
And, finally, we should also be aware that there are such things as roundabout means of production, i.e. establishing certain preconditions for the final victory. If we ignore these points, then we run the risk of becoming irrelevant to the time and place we live in. If we remember them, then at least we have a chance for victory, for we shall understand the true meaning of what it is to advocate setting a revolution into motion.
This article originally appeared in the Libertarian Forum, Vol. 3, No. 9 (1971), p. 6.
