Though politics may yet trump sound economics on this issue, writes Sean Corrigan, the Europeans know they are being blackmailed by the US into pursuing dangerously loose monetary policy (to add to the loose fiscal policies already being practiced by some of their governments). The biggest global spendthrift—usually the US—always expects his creditors to cut their own pockets so he can settle his bills with the coins falling out of them.
Hal Varian doesn't tell us why the dollar bill in our pocket has value, writes Frank Shostak. To say that the value of money is due to social convention is to say very little. What Varian has told us is that money has value because it is accepted, and why it is accepted? Because it is accepted! Obviously this is not a good explanation of why money has value.
The exchange rate is a measure of the relative value of these two currencies, not the value of the dollar or the euro per se. Perhaps the value of dollar and the euro have risen lately but the euro a bit more. Richard Johnsson believes that both have lost in value since mid-2001, only the euro has lost less than the dollar.
It was Mises, before Hardin, who identified the problem of overutilization wrought by public property. The problem is not limited to land ownership, however. In banking, writes Philipp Bagus, common deposit ownership leads to credit expansion and finally the drive to centralized control of money and banking in the form of a central bank.
Britain is similar to America in that it is suffering from the same political and economic maladies that have befallen its transatlantic cousin. Indeed, faced with a burgeoning fiscal deficit, fiat money-precipitated economic imbalances and renewed imperialism, albeit at Washington's behest, the U.K.'s own variant of "War, Prosperity and Depression," underscores the sources of America's woes. Grant Nülle explains.
Since the early 17th century, American governments (colonial, state, and federal) have tried and failed to restart business expansions by reflation, writes Scott Trask. But new money in the system is no substitute for genuine production. It is too early to see the long-run consequences of the Bush-Greenspan reflation, but if the past is any guide we can expect the next decade to more resemble the 1970s than the 1990s.
The disappearance of gold from the monetary scene is perhaps the most tragic economic calamity to befall the world of money in the twentieth century, writes Christopher Mayer. Views on gold in the first two decades of the twentieth century compared to those held today could scarcely be more different.
Hans Sennholz writes: No central bank on earth, not even the Federal Reserve System, can continually inflate its currency and defy market rates of interest without harming both its currency and the economy. Inflation tends to accelerate and ultimately destroy the currency and cripple the economy. And no government whatsoever can suffer budget deficits of half a trillion dollars annually without impairing its standing with its creditors.
The tax bills of many American families are falling during a period of exorbitant increases in federal spending due mainly to war and welfare spending. Odd? Not once we discover the record levels of government debt accumulation. It's the shell game of government finance at work.
H. Scott Trask sums it up: on the one hand, they believed in fractional-reserve banking, generally following Adam Smith's currency and banking theories. On the other hand, they were resolutely opposed to government-issued paper money, fiat money, legal tender laws, inconvertible paper currency, and land banks. On the question of a national bank, they were divided.
