American Foreign Policy and National-Security Management

National-security management is a 20th-century phenomenon. It is a product of three major factors in contemporary political development: technology, public opinion, and popular revolution. Technology has meant rapidity of communication — the ability to move both information and persons in short periods over great distances around the globe. The factor of public opinion is related to the increased rapidity of communication. Political leaders are required to be quickly responsive to public opinion formed by quick information. The political leaders’ response is control of information, and the control and manipulation of public opinion. Finally, and related to communication and public opinion, is the development in the 20th century of politics as a successful challenge not merely to the particular men in power, but also to the social status quo.

When foreign relations, wars, and peace conferences existed in the context of nonchallenge to the basic social system — mere rivalries between exploiting units whether states or corporate monopolies — there really was no role for national-security management because that role is profoundly ideological and requires a challenge against the existing ideology to be operative. An ideological challenge did arise in the midst of World War I. It was the result of two interrelated developments: American entry into the war, and the Russian Revolution.

Before the War

Previous to American entry into World War I, the leaders of the Allies and of the Central Powers did not conceive of the conflict in terms of total ideology. There were people on both sides who did so and they were used by the leaderships as an aid in maintaining support for the war effort. But the leaderships were willing and even anxious to negotiate a peace with the opposing governments if their adversaries made the concessions necessary to fulfill their war aims. There was no demand for unconditional victory and the transformation of the political system of the adversary. This was radically changed with the American entry into the war.

The prolonged nature of the war in Europe had intensified the reasons for and against the entry of the United States. Since the domestic political situation had required Woodrow Wilson, in the 1916 presidential election, to emphasize his peaceful intentions, the president’s introduction of a war effort into American life a few months later required strong actions to reverse public peace attitudes. Thus, the Central Powers were not treated as temporary military adversaries, but were defined as the Ultimate Evil. A major part of the problems, domestic and international, that faced the countries of the world was related to the existence of this Ultimate Evil; the total elimination of the Ultimate Evil would solve these problems.

The war effort took on the character of a crusade with all of its ideological implications. Some aspects of the crusade involved self-celebration; American democracy as an abstraction was emphasized without any regard for the elements that historically created it and that would be violated in the name of the abstraction. A vital part of this self-celebration was the objective of re-creating this democracy in the abstract in other countries, and especially in the major countries that had been subjected to autocratic regimes — the Central Powers and Czarist Russia. Thus, the February Revolution in Russia was a very significant event in the crusade ideology of the American government.

The February Revolution eliminated the major obstacle on the Allied side that made it difficult to characterize the Central Powers as the sole Ultimate Evil for the benefit of public opinion. The February Revolution seemed to justify the view that American democracy in the abstract could be re-created in one of the former autocratic regimes. Of course, for the American opponents of intervention, the February Revolution led to a different conclusion: a new regime in Russia would initiate the negotiations that would cause a peace settlement between the two sides without unconditional victory, American intervention, or immediate social change. Thus, the February Revolution highlighted a major distinction between the interventionist and noninterventionist positions in American politics — whether or not war was a positive force for social change in the world.

The interventionists viewed American society with satisfaction and thought that war made it possible to maintain at home and to extend to other peoples what satisfied them. The isolationists viewed American society with dissatisfaction and felt that war would maintain or increase what dissatisfied them. Senator Robert M. La Follette’s (R., Wis.) speech in opposition to Wilson’s speech calling for a declaration of war in April 1917 shows the differences very clearly. In contrast to Wilson’s “idealism,” La Follette recognized that war and militarism would contribute to the decline of American liberalism. War and militarism enhanced executive leadership, which was incompatible with liberalism. La Follette called on his fellow senators to vote on the basis of conviction and not on the basis of presidential leadership:

Quite another doctrine has recently been promulgated by certain newspapers, which unfortunately seems to have found considerable support elsewhere, and that is the doctrine of “standing back of the President,” without inquiring whether the President is right or wrong…. If it is important for us to speak and vote our convictions in matters of internal policy, though we may unfortunately be in disagreement with the President, it is infinitely more important for us to speak and vote our convictions when the question is one of peace or war, certain to involve the lives and fortunes of many of our people and, it may be, the destiny of all of them and of the civilized world as well….

This is the question that neutral nations the world over are asking. Are we seizing upon this war to consolidate and extend an imperialistic policy? … It is suggested by some that our entrance into the war will shorten it. It is my firm belief, based upon such information as I have, that our entrance into the war will not only prolong it, but that it will vastly extend its area by drawing in other nations…. Just a word of comment more upon one of the points in the President’s address. He says that this is a war “for the things which we have always carried nearest to our hearts — for democracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own government.” In many places throughout the address is this exalted sentiment given expression…. I am not talking now of the merits or demerits of any government, but I am speaking of a profession of democracy that is linked in action with the most brutal and domineering use of autocratic power.

Are the people of this country being so well represented in this war movement that we need to go abroad to give other people control of their governments? Will the President and the supporters of this war bill submit it to a vote of the people before the declaration of war goes into effect? …

 

The espionage bills, the conscription bills, and other forcible military measures which we understand are being ground out of the war machine in this country is the complete proof that those responsible for this war fear that it has no popular support and that armies sufficient to satisfy the demands of the entente allies can not be recruited by voluntary enlistments … 1

Bolshevik Spokesmen in America: Proletarian Commissars, Legionnaires of Death, and Republican Communists

La Follette’s strongly stated opposition to American intervention led to a demand in the press that he be expelled from the Senate and he was subjected to a senatorial investigation committee. From opposition to entry into the war it was natural for isolationist spokesmen such as La Follette to criticize sharply the American intervention in the Russian Revolution; La Follette was labeled the “Bolshevik spokesman in America.” The Soviet Revolution of October 1917, was a product of the profound shock to Western society administered by the first modern total war. The Soviet Revolution represented a major challenge to the expansionist democratic ideology that was pursued by the Wilson administration. The model of re-created American democracy, which the February Revolution was believed to have initiated, was replaced by a model of social revolution that was feared as imminent in all the Western countries. The disappointment for Wilsonian “idealism” was monumental.

Unable to reverse the developments in Russia, the Wilson administration incorporated the Soviet Revolution into the conceptualization of Ultimate Evil represented by the Central Powers. The Bolsheviks were defined as the conscious and directed agents of the Central Powers’ decision-makers. Thus, the original interventions by American forces in Archangel and Siberia were made in the last summer of the war as part of the world strategy of defeating the Central Powers in the form of their local Russian operatives, as conceived by the Wilsonians, the Bolshevik Party. Thus, when World War I ended, there was an easy transferal to the Bolsheviks of the Ultimate Evil conceptualization when social revolution did begin to sweep much of central Europe — Germany, Hungary, and Austria. The major part of the problems, domestic and international, that troubled countries of the world and that was supposed to disappear with total victory over the Central Powers could be explained in terms of the existence of the Soviet Revolution as their successor. Total elimination of this Ultimate Evil would be the solution to these problems.2

The Soviet Revolution was a challenge also because it eliminated a major unit in the world production of raw materials and in international loans. Secretary of State Robert Lansing insisted:

Russia is among the largest factors in the complicated system of production and distribution by which the world is clothed and fed. It is not to be expected that economic balance can be regained and living costs brought once more to moderate levels while its vast area [is under the revolution].3

Thus, the US government identified its own prosperity with the stability and availability of raw-material production and markets around the globe. Again, the Soviet Revolution was a challenge as a model for revolution by other countries in a similar position in the world economy.

However, for American national-security managers of the Wilson administration, the concept of the Soviet Revolution as the Ultimate Evil was focused on Central and Eastern Europe as social revolution spread there at the end of World War I. When the feudal and military bureaucracies of central Europe were on the verge of overthrow by revolutionary movements, the Wilsonians sought to prevent revolutions while replacing the old bureaucracy with a new liberal bureaucratic and mercantile leadership. Thus, the American decision-makers — president, secretary of state, presidential advisers, and military planners — in Paris for the Versailles Conference were able to apply American economic and military power in Europe to facilitate and support the transfer of cabinet positions to the socialist leaders who acted as “an ideal foil against revolutionary and anarchist excesses” of social revolutionaries. This role played by liberals and socialists as wardens against social revolution in 1919 is reminiscent of John Kennedy’s summarizing of American policy with reference to the Dominican Republic:

There are three possibilities in descending order of preference, a decent democratic regime, a continuation of the Trujillo regime or a Castro regime. We ought to aim at the first, but we really can’t renounce the second until we are sure that we can avoid the third.4

Similarly, the Wilsonians found themselves supporting reactionary and oppressive regimes to prevent the success of social revolutionaries — Kolchak in Siberia, Horthy in Hungary, etc. In Russia during the Civil War and in postwar Central Europe the role of food was crucial and the United States used its relief operations headed by Herbert Hoover to try to establish the governments it desired and to defeat those it opposed. American advisers in both World Wars and the Cold War — often the same people, such as Allen and John Foster Dulles (nephews of Secretary of State Lansing), Bernard Baruch, and Herbert Hoover — viewed American postwar economic aims as twofold: using economic power to prevent the rise or success of revolutionary movements, and improving the long-term economic position of US-government-supported corporate interests around the world. Arno Mayer has noted:

Admittedly Hoover had the most precocious, integrated, and operational conception of the politics and diplomacy of foreign aid. But he merely articulated and synthesized ideas and programs which were just then crystallized in influential segments of the American power elite.5

Hoover’s role as well as that of other Wilsonians in using foreign aid for administration political and economic objectives was related to the direct military interventions by American and other Allied forces by American critics of the administration. Senators William Borah of Idaho and Hiram Johnson of California, leading insurgent Republican foreign policy experts, singled out the Wilson administration’s role in Russia for major consideration.

Late in 1918 and early in 1919, they initiated a campaign against the American forces’ intervention in Archangel and Siberia. Despite the growing debate concerning the peace conference in Paris and the proposal for the League of Nations, Borah and Johnson made the demand for recognition of the Soviet government and the withdrawal of American forces the center of their attention. The intervention of American military forces in Russia against the Soviet Union was emphasized by Borah and Johnson in the debate over the League of Nations and the Versailles Treaty as an example of the role that the United States would play around the world, as international policemen, should league membership be adopted. “Borah often alluded to the situation in Russia as a preview of things to come should the United States join the organization.”6

Citing Russia, where Japanese, British, French, and American troops were working to overthrow the Bolshevik government, the senator looked ahead to the time when such operations would become commonplace. He anticipated that the league would be used as a cloak of respectability to protect the status quo everywhere. Denouncing efforts to “underwrite the world” as impossible and undesirable, Borah predicted that what had happened in Russia, Mexico, and China would occur, sooner or later, all over the globe. He regarded emergent nationalism as the irresistible force of the 20th century and despised the idea of placing the United States on the side he thought fated to lose.7

Critics of national-security management viewed the Versailles Treaty and the League of Nations as the foundation for an inevitable second world war. The New Republic said of the treaty: “THIS IS NOT PEACE. Americans would be fools if they permitted themselves to be embroiled in a system of European alliances.” The league’s power to threaten the use of force in preservation of the status quo established under the treaty for the benefit of the major imperialist founders of the league increased the disquiet of the critics. Oswald Garrison Villard, the publisher of the Nation, wrote to Senator La Follette:

The more I study it, the more I am convinced that it is the most iniquitous peace document ever drawn, that it dishonors America because it violates our solemn national pledge given to the Germans at the time of the Armistice and because it reeks with bad faith, revengefulness and inhumanity. It is worse than the Treaty of Vienna … it not only retains the old and vicious order of the world, but makes it worse and then puts the whole control of the situation in the hands of four or five statesmen — and, incidentally, of the International Bankers. To my mind it seals the ruin of the modern capitalistic system and constitutes a veritable Pandora’s Box out of which will come evils of which we have not as yet any conception.

Villard believed that the league would encourage the imperialist powers to refuse to solve international problems by peaceful means because the league would give them the sanctity of legality when other countries sought to terminate injustices. For Villard, the league enshrined and prevented the peaceful ending of the whole imperialist system that the national liberation movements in China, India, Egypt, Africa, and Latin America were striving to destroy.8

Borah felt that the instruments of American national-security management — gunboat diplomacy, marine pacifications, military coups, and major interventions by American forces as in Russia — would find frequent use as well as sanctification under the league. The decision-makers in Washington would have greater rather than less reason to apply the methods that combined statements of “morality” and “legality” with the power of military force. Most disquieting to Borah was the cover that the league would give to decision-makers always unwilling to trust public opinion.

Now the President advocated a program which would remove diplomacy even further from popular control. The same men who previously had sent marine contingents to Latin American republics at the request of New York bankers would now huddle in closed sessions with their counterparts from other nations. And the Senate, robbed of its deliberative function in the area of foreign affairs, would have to accept the agreements made or be accused of bad faith.9

Critics of national-security management during the debate on the League of Nations were subjected to intense attacks by the newspapers supporting the administration. Borah was designated the “Proletarian Commissar,” while Johnson was described as a “Spartacide.” As a group they were called the “Legionnaires of Death,” the “Soviet of Eight,” and the “Republican Communists.”10 However, William Appleman Williams has provided a more balanced and penetrating analysis of Borah and the leading critics of Wilsonianism:

At the other extreme was an even smaller group of men who were almost doctrinaire laissez-faire liberals in domestic affairs and antiempire men in foreign policy. Led by Senator William E. Borah, they made many perceptive criticisms of existing policy…. The argument advanced by Borah and other antiempire spokesmen was based on the proposition that America neither could nor should undertake to make or keep the world safe for democracy.

… And even if it were possible to build such an empire, they concluded, the effort violated the spirit of democracy itself. Borah provided a classic summary of these two arguments in one of his speeches attacking the proposal to clamp a lid on the revolutionary ferment in China after 1917. “Four hundred million people imbued with the spirit of independence and of national integrity are in the end invincible.” … He concluded that a rapprochement with the Soviet Union was “the key to a restored Europe, to a peaceful Europe.” In addition, he thought that the United States could play a crucial role in creating the circumstances in which there could “emerge a freer, a more relaxed, a more democratic Russia.” “ … So long as you have a hundred and fifty million people outlawed in a sense, it necessarily follows that you cannot have peace.” … Of all Americans, the group around Borah most clearly understood the principle and practice of self-determination in foreign affairs. For that reason, as well as other aspects of Borah’s criticism, President Wilson singled out Borah as his most important critic — as the man who might turn out to be right.11

Between World Wars

In the postwar period American national-security management was concentrated on Central America and the Caribbean, and on the Far East. Thus, there was continuity of the policies of interventionism in the administrations of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson. An important example was Nicaragua. Henry Stimson, who learned the application of American power in Central America when he was secretary of war from 1911 to 1913, arrived in Nicaragua as special commissioner, the ultimate result of this American intervention being the rise of the Somoza dictatorship. After holding the governor-generalship of the Philippines (where he worked for the rejection of legislation for Philippine independence), Stimson became Hoover’s secretary of state.

There Stimson’s principal activity concerned the relations of Japan with regard to Manchuria. President Hoover feared that Stimson’s attitude toward Japan — the Stimson Doctrine — would invite war with Japan. For Stimson, nonrecognition of territorial changes made outside of treaty obligations was not an alternative to military and economic sanctions as advocated by Hoover. Rather, it was a preliminary to economic and military sanctions, a way of drawing sharp the issue between the United States (along with the League of Nations) and Japan, a means of laying down the ideological grounds for war if, as he expected, war eventually should come. That was the Stimson doctrine — or, perhaps, the Stimson-Roosevelt doctrine.

In the months before Franklin Roosevelt’s inauguration in March 1933, Stimson viewed himself as “Roosevelt’s acting Secretary of State,” and Roosevelt adopted Stimson’s foreign policy views and made them the basis of New Deal foreign policy, especially in the Far East.12

Similarly, Stimson’s policy toward Cuba, which, like Nicaragua, he defined as moving toward Communism, led the new Roosevelt administration to replace a radical administration with Fulgencio Batista, as, in the words of Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles, “the only individual in Cuba today who represented authority.” The subtle and sophisticated measures of Roosevelt, Hull, Welles, Adolph Berle, and Nelson Rockefeller (Roosevelt’s Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs) to maintain US hegemony in Latin America have recently been thoroughly analyzed.

The ideological direction of the New Deal policy makers was summarized by Herbert Feis in 1940: “Violent social revolution anywhere in the world is disadvantageous to us. We must contribute, if the chance exists, to an orderly social program.”13

The failure of the New Deal as an economic system caused the redefinition of the New Deal as a system of national-security management. By 1940 American unemployment was as high as in 1932; US economic policy in the 1930s caused longer unemployment and deeper decline in economic activity than suffered by any other industrialized nation. Thus, the cause of American economic difficulty was externalized, and the economy subsidized by the needs defined by the national-security concept. Public opinion in the United States was presented with a popular ideological formulation of national security by Henry Luce in an American Century editorial in early 1941. A more precise formulation was presented to the annual convention of the Investment Bankers Association in December 1940, by Virgil Jordan, president of the National Industrial Conference Board. Jordan declared:

Before we can understand any of the needs of industry for national defense, we must first try to comprehend what this thing we call our “defense program” really means. We have not yet been willing to look the phrase squarely in the face…. Our government has committed the American community to participation in this war as the economic ally of England, and as her spiritual, if not her political, partner in her struggle with the enemies of the British Empire everywhere in the world, to help prevent, if possible, their destruction of the Empire, and if this should not be possible, to take her place as the heir and residuary legatee or receiver for whatever economic and political assets of the Empire survive her defeat…. Whatever the outcome of the war, America has embarked upon a career of imperialism, both in world affairs and in every other aspect of her life, with all the opportunities, responsibilities, and perils which that implies….

At best, England will become a junior partner in a new Anglo-Saxon imperialism, in which the economic resources and the military and naval strength of the United States will be the center of gravity. Southward in our hemisphere and westward in the Pacific the path of empire takes its way, and in modern terms of economic power as well as political prestige, the scepter passes to the United States … From the pages of British experience, however, we know some of the things that this white man’s burden may mean when we assume it. We know it implies a vast responsibility of assembling, applying, and conserving the financial resources upon which it rests. We know, too, from some of the darker pages of British experience in the past century, that it implies an enormous task of expanding and maintaining a vast organization of man-power, machines and equipment, not merely for national defense, but for effective and continuous exercise of international authority in the maintenance of peace and order….

 

All this is what lies beneath the phrase national security — some of it deeply hidden, some of it very near the surface and soon to emerge to challenge us.14

Career Imperialism and Neocolonialism

The initial working out of this “career of imperialism” during World War II has been admirably detailed in the study by Gabriel Kolko, The Politics of War. The International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, foreign aid, and world trade programs were principal instruments for American policy makers. A major American objective through its economic policy was the “reintegration of the U.S.S.R. into the capitalist world economy on a basis which economists have dubbed as neocolonialism.”15

At the end of the war in Europe, Secretary of State James Byrnes devoted himself to this objective. As described by Byrnes with regard to the postwar treaties with Germany’s eastern European partners:

Perhaps most important of all the treaties will make possible the entry of the ex-enemy states (Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria) into the United Nations and their participation in the benefits and responsibilities of such specialized agencies as the International Bank, the Monetary Fund, the Food and Agricultural Organization.

Obviously, for the Soviet Union this economic penetration by the United States or US-dominated international agencies meant eventual political control in Central and Eastern Europe.16

The role of United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) is an example. In 1945 the political power of food in preventing or overthrowing social revolution in 1919 was recalled by American policy makers. The United States attempted to have Americans appointed the heads of UNRRA in most European countries. When that was resisted, Herbert Hoover advised that food programs be shifted from the neutral UNRRA to US military authorities. War Secretary Henry Stimson said in 1945 that Hoover’s “ideas followed very much the line which [John J.] McCloy and I had been fighting for…. We could turn the tide of Communism in all these countries. Hoover stamped out Communism in this way in central Europe.” What Stimson, McCloy, Hoover, etc., did not recognize was that the premises of European Communism in 1945 just as of European socialism in 1919 condemned it to passivity, to cooperation and integration into the program of Allied imperialism.17

But Ambassador to Russia Averell Harriman and Navy Secretary James Forrestal were reminding each other that a conflict with the Soviet Union was inevitable. George Kennan, counselor of the embassy in Russia, in 1945 recognized the basic conservatism of Soviet diplomacy, but in May 1945, raised the specter of European left insurgencies:

Moscow would have no reason to contemplate a further military advance in Europe…. the danger for the West is not Russian invasion — it is the Communist parties in the Western countries themselves, plus the unreal hopes and fears the Western people had been taught to entertain.

However, it was the Communist parties of the West that, under the influence of the Soviet Union, entertained the “unreal hopes and fears” and acted as conservative forces disarming the armed resistance forces in France, Italy, and Greece, and creating the conditions for cooptation.18

Forced to choose between obedience and revolutionary success, the popular, national Communist parties in Yugoslavia and China disobeyed Soviet policy and thereby gained success. But in Greece, the National Liberation Front during 1945 under Soviet prompting

after virtually possessing most of Greece and besting the British forces in combat, willingly surrendered its arms and staked its future on the reliability of British promises and their small and anxious local allies. This abdication was possible only because the Communists in the [Front] dictated it over a movement they could barely control.

Greece was the most tragic example of the conservative role adopted by the postwar European Communist parties:

The simple matter is that whenever leaders of the Old Order incorporated the Left into a modernized, reformed capitalism, the Left willingly assumed the role assigned to it. Where the occupation forces repressed it and brought the naked power of reaction to bear, the Left reluctantly fought, and lost, and this was the true lesson of Greece.

However, as in Vietnam where the Vietminh were able to defeat the French who were then replaced by the Americans, the Greek guerrillas caused the British in early 1947 to announce that they were immediately disengaging from the Greek conflict and that the United States should take its place there.

At that time the United States was in the process of developing its major foreign aid program, which eventually became the Marshall Plan. Dean Acheson, undersecretary of state, said that the United States was prosperous because of its large-scale export trade. However, it was exporting twice as much as it was importing, which meant that foreign countries, especially in Europe, would not have the dollars to purchase US exports. The results could lead to crises in the European economies with serious political consequences, and a recession in America.

But the withdrawal of the British from Greece would have meant a guerrilla victory before the operation of the Marshall Plan could take effect. As William Clayton, undersecretary of state for economic affairs, stated in testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “If these countries [Greece and Turkey] and the other countries should adopt closed economies, you can imagine the effect that it would have on our foreign trade…. it is important that we do everything we can to retain those export markets.”20

Already during 1946 America’s naval presence was introduced in the eastern Mediterranean with immediate reference to the guerrilla struggle in Greece as well as the long-run US interests in the Near East. Yet, this action was part of a more general policy toward the Soviet Union centering upon increased militarization of relations by the United States. Secretary of State Byrnes’s Stuttgart speech of September 6, 1946, delivered before General Lucius Clay’s American occupation forces, indicated US intentions to use Germany as a principal military position on the borders of the Soviet Union.21

In the model created in the Greek crisis no consideration was given to the possibility that the guerrillas had personally determined to engage in a struggle against the government’s oppression rather than submit. No analysis was made of the relationships between the Greek guerrillas and the various Communist states — Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Albania — or between those states and the Soviet Union. The guerrillas were agents of the Soviet Union in the minds of the national-security bureaucracy. In the Greek model, the Greek regime’s request for US aid was drafted in Washington and sent to Athens for submission through Greek diplomatic officials. The US assistant secretary of state explained that the request

had been drafted with a view to the mentality of Congress…. It would also serve to protect the US government against internal and external charges that it was taking the initiative of intervening in a foreign state or that it had been persuaded by the British to take over a bad legacy from them.22

The Truman Doctrine

The president’s speech to Congress proclaiming the Truman Doctrine was weighed for every effect on Congress and public opinion by presidential adviser Clark Clifford and Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson. Nevertheless, there was opposition to the Truman Doctrine. As noted by Joseph Jones in his celebration of the preparation of the Truman Doctrine entitled The Fifteen Weeks:

Most of the outright opposition came from the extreme Left and the extreme Right of the political spectrum: from a certain school of “liberals” who had long been strongly critical of the administration’s stiffening policy toward the Soviet Union, and from the “isolationists” who had been consistent opponents of all foreign policy measures that projected the United States actively in World affairs…. The opposition of the Left emphasized that American aid to the existing Greek and Turkish governments would not promote freedom but would protect anti-democratic and reactionary regimes; and that the proposed action bypassed the United Nations and endangered its future. The opposition of the Right emphasized that the President’s policy would probably, if not inevitably, lead to war; and that the American economy could not stand the strains of trying to stop Communism with dollars.23

Former Vice-President Henry A. Wallace originally supported economic aid for reconstruction in Greece and the creation of an American economic mission in Greece to administer it:

Greece cannot do this alone…. I don’t believe in American imperialism, but as a stop-gap I believe that it is enlightened selfishness for the United States to step in now with a well-planned, efficiently administered loan…. But our obligation goes much further than the mere giving of money. There is the further responsibility of seeing to it that the money we give is spent on the things for which we gave it.

However, Wallace reacted strongly against the Truman Doctrine, which he called “a military lend-lease program,” that would waste $400 million on military purchases rather than rebuilding the Greek economy as a market for US capital and goods.24

Although the Truman Doctrine was supported by the Republican majority as well as the entire Democratic membership as part of the emerging bipartisan foreign policy, almost one hundred isolationist Republicans in the House of Representatives attacked the Greek government as a dictatorship kept in power by foreign military power and by corrupt and fraudulent elections. Their floor leader was Representative George Bender of Ohio. On March 28, 1947, he declared:

I believe that the White House program is a reaffirmation of the nineteenth-century belief in power politics. It is a refinement of the policy first adopted after the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 designed to encircle Russia and establish a “Cordon Sanitaire” around the Soviet Union. It is a program which points to a new policy of interventionism in Europe as a corollary to our Monroe Doctrine in South America. Let there be no mistake about the far-reaching implications of this plan. Once we have taken the historic step of sending financial aid, military experts and loans to Greece and Turkey, we shall be irrevocably committed to a course of action from which it will be impossible to withdraw. More and larger demands will follow. Greater needs will arise throughout the many areas of friction in the world.25

Bender was among the few congressional defenders of Henry Wallace when the latter was widely attacked for his proposals, made in England and France, that Europe oppose the Truman Doctrine’s division of the world into two camps and instead act as a balance between them. Wallace’s speeches in Europe led to a bipartisan demand for the revocation of his passport; and Bender lashed out at the open season on Wallace. He replied to Churchill’s attack on Wallace for speaking abroad by noting that if Churchill could seek to inflame the Cold War by speeches in America (Fulton, Mo., address of March 5, 1946), Wallace could seek to prevent that war by speeches in Europe. On June 6, 1947, Bender presented an overall criticism of the bipartisan foreign policy in a speech against Representative Karl Mundt’s (R., S.D.) attempt to give a cover of legality to the Voice of America program that the State Department had been operating. Bender said,

The Voice of America broadcasts are just one piece of the Truman Doctrine.

The pieces are beginning to fall into place, and the pattern is becoming clear. It is not a pretty pattern; it is not a pattern which the people of the United States can look on with confidence or with a sense of hope for the future…. But we have learned to look behind the titles or labels of measures prepared by the Truman administration.

The Greek-Turkey-aid bill was presented to this Congress as a humanitarian measure, designed to relieve hunger and suffering. The Truman administration attempted to conceal and disguise its true character, which was admitted only after the measure was subjected to searching examination on the floor of the House. Then it was admitted that all of the so-called aid to Turkey was to be military aid, and most of the aid to Greece was to be military aid. The humanitarian purpose turned out to be hypocrisy. No, we must look behind the high-sounding title in the present bill about the interchange of knowledge and seek out the true character of this measure. Its true character is not difficult to discover. The Voice of America program is nothing more or less than the propaganda arm of the Truman Doctrine. It is just one more piece in the pattern of the Truman adventure in international relations.

What are some of the other pieces in the Truman program which have become more apparent in the past few days? On May 26, Mr. Truman urged the Congress to authorize a program of military collaboration with all the petty and not so petty dictators of South America. Mr. Truman submitted a draft bill which would authorize the United States to take over the arming of South America on a scale far beyond that involved in the $400,000,000 hand-out to Greece and Turkey.

Mr. Truman continued his campaign for universal peacetime training in the United States…. But military control at home is a part of the emerging Truman program. The Truman administration is using all its propaganda resources in an attempt to soften up the American people to accept this idea.

Yes; the Truman administration is busy in its attempt to sell the idea of military control to the people of America. And hand in hand with the propaganda campaign go secret meetings for industrial mobilization.

This is the kind of thing which is taking place behind barred doors in the Pentagon Building, about which the people of the United States learn only by accident. This is a part of the emerging Truman program.

It is against this background that the Voice of America program must be considered. This vast foreign propaganda machine prepared by the administration is a part of this program. It is a part just as Mr. Truman’s friendship with the dictator Peron of South America is a part. It is a part just as Mr. Truman’s eagerness for universal military training in the United States is a part. It is a part just as Mr. Truman’s proposal for arming every South American country to the teeth is a part. It is a part of the whole Truman Doctrine of drawing off the resources of the United States in support of every reactionary government in the world.

I am opposed to the Voice of America just as I am opposed to every part of the dangerous and irresponsible Truman doctrine.26

The Marshall Plan
    

Representative Bender’s speech was made the day following Secretary of State George Marshall’s Harvard speech of June 5 announcing the foreign economic-aid program that became known as the Marshall Plan. The Truman Doctrine was intimately related to the long-range planning for the foreign economic-aid program. The close relationship between military activity, as in Greece, and economic problems for the Truman administration is indicated by a policy summary by Navy Secretary James Forrestal:

As long as we can outproduce the world, can control the sea and can strike inland with the atomic bomb, we assume certain risks otherwise unacceptable in an effort to restore world trade, to restore the balance of power — military power — and to eliminate some of the conditions which breed war.27

Forrestal’s views reflected the analyses prepared for him by his principal theoretician, George Kennan.

Kennan’s reports for Forrestal became the basis for Kennan’s famous “X” article on containment of Communism that appeared in 1947 in Foreign Affairs. These reports from his post at the National War College, where he had been assigned by Forrestal, provided the ideological content for the aggressive policy of containment that was represented by the Truman Doctrine. This was supposed to prevent the success of left movements in Europe. Describing the aggressive attitude of the Truman Doctrine, Kennan has indicated in his Memoirs how lack of precision in the “X” article contributed to the universalization of the concept of containment. Kennan’s intention was to limit the geographical relevancy of the concept of containment to Europe. Kennan’s regret has been that the policy of containment was extended from Europe to the whole world. The strong criticisms in his “X” article (which was written from December 1946 to January 1947) that gave the containment concept its wide interpretation were aimed at the opposition to the Truman foreign policy, which was evidenced both by the election of the Republican-controlled Eightieth Congress and by the resignation of Henry Wallace as Secretary of Commerce. Kennan in 1947 became the aide of Marshall and Acheson in the State Department, head of the Policy Planning Staff, and architect of the Marshall Plan.28

The concept of a large-scale multinational program of American foreign aid for economic recovery had become central to State Department planning. In the spring of 1947 the State Department believed that the American economy would be undermined by an impending European economic collapse. This situation would result in political changes that were unacceptable to American planners. Preparations for a speech by Acheson outlining the future Marshall Plan were begun in early April. Acheson presented it as a major address to the Delta Council in Cleveland, Mississippi, on May 8. After describing the importance of foreign exports for the US economic stability and the inability of foreign nations to cover the costs of their present purchases from the United States, Acheson continued:

The extreme need of foreign countries for American products is likely, therefore, to continue undiminished in 1948, while the capacity of foreign countries to pay in commodities will be only slightly increased…. What do these facts of international life mean for the United States and for United States foreign policy? … the United States is going to have to undertake further emergency financing of foreign purchases if foreign countries are to continue to buy in 1948 and 1949 the commodities which they need to sustain life and at the same time rebuild their economies….

This is merely common sense and sound practice. It is in keeping with the policy announced by President Truman in his special message to Congress on March 12 on aid to Greece and Turkey…. Not only do human beings and nations exist in narrow economic margins, but also human dignity, human freedom, and democratic institutions. It is one of the principal aims of our foreign policy today to use our economic and financial resources to widen these margins. It is necessary if we are to preserve our own freedoms and our own democratic institutions. It is necessary for our national security.29

The national-security bureaucracy of the United States developed the view that the threat of social revolution abroad was a problem of modern management techniques — the management of economic aid to countries and economic incentives to individuals to maintain American dominance. The national security of the United States has been defined to demand that every country develop, economically and politically, under its aegis. The stable existence of the regimes in each of the countries is the central interest for the United States. If that stability cannot be guaranteed by the management of economic resources, such as trade and foreign aid, then it must be guaranteed by the management of violence. Thus, Acheson was prophetic in centering attention on the Truman Doctrine as a defining element in America’s future decision-making. The American military role in the Greek civil war became the model for American interventions in Korea, Iran, Guatemala, Indochina, the Middle East, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and ultimately in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. As former State Department official Richard Barnet has noted:

Almost twenty years later the President of the United States was defending his intervention in Vietnam by pointing to his predecessor’s success in Greece. The American experience in Greece not only set the pattern for subsequent interventions in internal wars but also suggested the criteria for assessing the success or failure of counterinsurgency operations…. One of the most important consequences of the American involvement in Greece in the 1940s was the development of new bureaucracies specializing in military assistance, police administration, and economic aid, committed to an analysis of revolution and a set of responses for dealing with it that would be applied to many different conflicts in the next twenty years.30

Major critical comment concerning the international difficulties of the United States by the late 1960s stressed the assumption by the US government of the role of world policeman. This role was sketched already by President Roosevelt during World War II as a special position for the Big Four, which was to be formalized by their rights as permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. When the potential success of this situation did not materialize, unilateral American military power came to represent the final arbiter in world politics. However, the use of US military power as an ultimate policy was the capstone of a much deeper and more sophisticated program of violence management: the organization of the existing police work in many countries of the world. In the immediate postwar period, US missions to Greece reorganized the police forces at the same time as a US mission was reorganizing the Iranian police (the head of this mission to Iran, a former superintendent of New Jersey State Police, in 1953 aided Middle East CIA chief, Kermit Roosevelt, to overthrow Iranian Premier Mossadegh). The major US intervention in Vietnam after the 1954 Geneva Conference involved the organization of the internal police activities that drove so many Vietnamese into opposition and the formation of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam. The CIA through the Michigan State University Advisory Group organized and developed Diem’s police forces. When the police function contributed to the development of the opposition, as in Vietnam, the substitution of US military forces as policemen was the natural extension of the process of the management of violence.31

The Policy Regime of McGeorge Bundy

The Korean War was the police action that clearly raised major issues concerning the policies of the national-security bureaucracy. The natural defender and spokesman of those policies was McGeorge Bundy. Bundy’s father had been assistant secretary of state and War Department adviser under Henry Stimson, and Bundy had coauthored Stimson’s memoirs. Then, he edited the papers of Secretary of State Dean Acheson (the father-in-law of his brother, William Bundy) while the Korean War was in progress. Bundy defended the unlimited power of the executive to undertake political and military action around the globe. He criticized those who desired to limit foreign crises by eliminating areas of friction through negotiations, or who opposed US military interventions. These approaches, according to Bundy, failed to assert America’s global leadership against Communism and substituted a defective attitude of doubt, mistrust, and fear regarding America’s national purpose in the world.32

In two articles in the Reporter, in 1951, “’Appeasement,’ ‘Provocation,’ and Policy” and “The Private World of Robert Taft,” McGeorge Bundy sketched his defense of the national-security bureaucracy. The ideological premise of that bureaucracy was stated by Bundy: “The major fact about our world is that it is in the throes of a great struggle for power between the Kremlin and the field.” For Bundy the central role of the national-security manager or policy maker is not the negotiation of peace traditional to statesmanship; instead, the central concern is power. The national-security manager controls diplomatic and military power and applies them in the permanent struggle against Communism in limited wars and the protowars of internal police activity in underdeveloped countries. For Bundy there is no such thing as too much force or too much domination by military factors; but his insistence upon permanent American intervention into the internal affairs of other countries naturally made him fear the American military’s tendency to use air power to minimize the loss of life among American forces, a loss acceptable to the national-security manager if not to the American people.33

Bundy’s concept of the national-security manager manipulating diplomatic and military elements in a long-term series of limited wars and limited protowar police activities in the underdeveloped countries is basically an elitist approach that excludes a positive role for public opinion, and, a fortiori, for public debate, including congressional debate. The public is not committed to the rigid national purpose whose ideology dominates the national-security bureaucracy. Thus, a positive role for public opinion, and for public debate, would introduce irreconcilable contradictions into political management. Instead, by excluding a positive role for public opinion, the public will simply react to existing crises that are presented to them by the national-security managers.

Bundy’s major criticism was leveled at those whom he labeled “appeasers” — mainly isolationists such as Senator Robert Taft (R., Ohio), who was dubbed by Bundy the “Reluctant Dragon” who would not wage the permanent crusade against Communism. Taft was viewed as the most perceptive and thoroughgoing critic of the policies of the Truman administration, which became the foundations for American foreign policy for the quarter century that followed. Taft attacked Truman’s dispatch of American troops outside of the United States without the direct approval of Congress. Taft and other critics “condemned US participation in Korea as unconstitutional and provided that the only funds available for overseas troops shipment should be funds necessary to facilitate the extrication of US forces now in Korea.” It was in opposition to the Truman administration’s desire to prevent open debate on foreign policy that Taft launched the Great Debate of 1951 with Secretary of State Acheson. The Great Debate surrounded the introduction of a resolution forbidding the president to send troops abroad without congressional approval. Taft noted the tendency of national-security managers to insinuate the United States into other countries’ affairs, followed by a conflict in which the president would demand unquestioning support in Congress:

After that, if anyone dared to suggest criticism or even a thorough debate, he was at once branded as an isolationist and a saboteur of unity and the bipartisan foreign policy.34

Taft’s final foreign policy statement before his death directed the same criticism he had leveled against Acheson toward Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. Taft and Dulles had been opponents when Dulles was Acheson’s special foreign policy adviser. Taft’s speech of May 26, 1953, was particularly concerned with Dulles’s Southeast Asia policy because the United States was increasing to seventy percent the amount it contributed to the support of France’s puppet regime against the guerrillas led by Ho Chi Minh. Dulles’s policy, Taft feared, along with the eventual defeat of the French, would lead to their replacement by the United States, including the potential intervention of American military forces against the guerrillas. Taft declared:

I have never felt that we should send American soldiers to the Continent of Asia, which, of course, included China proper and Indo-China, simply because we are so outnumbered in fighting a land war on the Continent of Asia that it would bring about complete exhaustion even if we were able to win…. So today, as since 1947 in Europe and 1950 in Asia, we are really trying to arm the world against Communist Russia, or at least furnish all the assistance which can be of use to them in opposing Communism. Is this policy of uniting the free world against Communism in time of peace going to be a practical long-term policy? I have always been a skeptic on the subject of the military practicability of NATO…. I have always felt that we should not attempt to fight Russia on the ground on the Continent of Europe any more than we should attempt to fight China on the Continent of Asia.35

Although the experience of US intervention in Vietnam confirms Senator Taft’s analyses of executive dominance of foreign policy and the role of the national-security bureaucracy, McGeorge Bundy did not reevaluate his criticism of Taft and his support of Acheson’s national-security management. Bundy’s years as national-security manager during the Kennedy-Johnson administrations confirmed him in every concept he expressed when defending Acheson’s policy making against Taft. In Foreign Affairs (January 1967) Bundy indicated that his major consideration was that the Vietnam experience must increase the confidence of the American people in the ability of the national-security management to maintain US world dominance (Bundy noted that four-fifths of all foreign investments are controlled by the United States). Any negotiations concerning Vietnam must be conducted, according to Bundy, so that there is no appearance of defeat for the United States, for then the American public would radically question the whole structure and ideology of US world dominance. He advocated manipulation of Vietnam negotiations to retain public confidence in the whole national-security process.

Thus, an original part of the purpose of the Vietnam intervention was quickly achieved: client governments of the United States were assured that the US government would gamble on continuing them in power against popular revolutions even at the cost of American lives. Bundy viewed, as a vital consequence of the Vietnam War, the need for continued commitment by the American public to “extensive policies” and “extensive actions” which require the national-security bureaucracy to apply military and diplomatic means, bombing and negotiations, and every other option, alternative, and instrument in the national-security arsenal. Bundy considered the most conspicuous expansion during the Kennedy-Johnson administrations to be the management of violence — and that this has “been right, and that it is right to persevere.”36

Thus, the national-security management views its role ultimately as a police role: neither a political role, which would seek the support of the people involved, nor a military role, which would not pretend to be aimed at the benefit of the people subjected to it, but the police role of application of violence against the will of the people but for their benefit. Early in the Kennedy administration US strategists announced the “new theory” that US massive fire power could win guerrilla warfare without gaining support from the people where the warfare existed. Walt W. Rostow was the principal spokesman for this “new theory,” and to cope with national-security management in the 1970s Rostow now suggests that US troops will continue to be used in the underdeveloped world for the management of crises. Rostow said,

we shall see in other parts of the world as well the positioning of forward equipment, with more of our forces maintained in the center but capable of quick movement. That will have to evolve with the big aircraft…. you must have overseas bases which are secure which contain some heavy equipment. We are now talking about things that are for the seventies.

These plans for future management of violence are programmed; the crucial ingredient remains the confidence of the American people in the ideology of the national-security process.37

Richard Nixon, Leader of the Free World

Richard Nixon recognized this when he assumed the presidency in 1969; central to his administration has been the struggle for the confidence of the public through avoidance of public debate, including congressional debate, while pursuing national-security management, especially in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. Future management of violence depends upon the continued support for the military base of national security. In his commencement address at the Air Force Academy on June 4, 1969, Nixon said,

On the home front, you are under attack from those who question the need for a strong national defense and indeed see a danger in the power of the defenders….

They believe that we can be conciliatory and accommodating only if we do not have the strength to be otherwise. They believe that America will be able to deal with the possibility of peace only when we are unable to cope with the threat of war.

Those who think that way have grown weary of the weight of free world leadership that fell upon us in the wake of World War II.

They argue that the United States is as much responsible for the tensions in the world as the adversaries we face. They assert that the United States is blocking the road to peace by maintaining its military strength at home and its defenses abroad. And if we would only reduce our forces, they contend, tensions would disappear, and the chances for peace would brighten.

America’s powerful military presence on the world scene, they believe, makes peace abroad improbable and peace at home impossible.

Now we should never underestimate the appeal of this isolationist school of thought. Their slogans are simplistic and powerful: Charity begins at home. Let’s first solve our problems at home and then we can deal with the problems of the world.

This simple formula touches a responsive chord with many an overburdened taxpayer. And it would be easy — easy for a President of the United States to buy some popularity by going along with the new isolationists….

I hold a totally different view of the world, and I come to a different conclusion about the direction America must take….

I say that America has a vital national interest in world stability, and no other nation can uphold that interest for us.38

National-security management in the 1970s is rooted in the same basic factors of technology, public opinion, and popular revolution.

The management of violence through the threat of American military intervention requires American public opinion’s acceptance of a powerful military establishment and of its use. Both have received the most serious challenges since the emergence of national-security management. Public opinion, including congressional debate, has acquired a chance to eliminate during the 1970s the institutions of national-security management, and to restore constitutional decision-making.

• 1Arthur A. Ekirch, Jr., ed., Voices in Dissent, An Anthology of Individualist Thought in the United States (New York: Citadel Press, 1964), pp. 211-220.
• 2H. C. Peterson and Gilbert C. Fite, Opponents of War, 1917–1918 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1968), pp. 67–72; Arthur A. Ekirch, Jr., The Decline of American Liberalism (Toronto: Longmans, 1955), pp. 215-220; William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New York: World Publishing Co., 1962), pp. 86-102; William Appleman Williams, “American Intervention in Russia: 1917-20,” in David Horowitz, ed., Containment and Revolution (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967), pp. 26-70.
• 3N. Gordon Levin, Jr., Woodrow Wilson and World Politics, America’s Response to War and Revolution (New York: Oxford, 1970), pp. 235-236.
• 4Arno J. Mayer, Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking, Containment and Counterrevolution at Versailles, 1918–1919 (New York: Knopf, 1967), pp. 10-22; Richard J. Barnet, Intervention and Revolution, The United States in the Third World (New York: World, 1968), p. 158.
• 5Mayer, op. cit., pp. 24-28, 263-279.
• 6Ibid., pp. 331-339; Robert James Maddox, William E. Borah and American Foreign Policy (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1969), pp. 41-46, and Maddox notes (p. 46): “By mid-February a Johnson resolution calling for withdrawal of American forces was defeated only by Vice-President Thomas Marshall’s tie-breaking vote”; Ralph Stone, The Irreconcilables, The Fight Against the League of Nations (Lexington, Ky.: University Press of Kentucky, 1970), pp. 15-21, 39-41.
• 7Maddox, op. cit., p. 61.
• 8Ekirch, American Liberalism, pp. 226-228; D. Joy Humes, Oswald Garrison Villard (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, i960), pp. 223-228.
• 9Maddox, op. cit., p. 60.
• 10Stone, The Irreconcilables, p. 159; cf. Ray Tucker and Frederick R. Barkley, Sons of the Wild Jackass (New York: Books for Libraries, 1970), pp. 70-122.
• 11Williams, op. cit., pp. 118-122.
• 12Richard N. Current, “The Stimson Doctrine and the Hoover Doctrine,” in William Appleman Williams, ed., The Shaping of American Diplomacy (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1956), II, pp. 690–706; William L. Neumann, America Encounters Japan (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1963), pp. 228-289; William L. Neumann, “Determinism, Destiny and Myth in the American Image of China,” in George L. Anderson, ed., Issues and Conflicts, Studies in Twentieth Century American Diplomacy (Lawrence, Kan.: University of Kansas Press, 1959), pp. 1-20; Robert Freeman Smith, “American Foreign Relations 1920-1942,” in Barton J. Bernstein, ed., Towards a New Past, pp. 232-256; Fred L. Israel, The War Diary of Breckinridge Long . . . 1939-1944 (Lincoln, Neb.: University of Nebraska Press, 1966), pp. 81-82.
• 13Robert F. Smith, The United States and Cuba: Business and Diplomacy, 1917-1960 (New York: Bookman Associates, 1960), pp. 144-164; Lloyd C. Gardner, Economic Aspects of New Deal Diplomacy (Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1964), pp. 53-57; David Green, The Containment of Latin America (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971), pp. 3-58.
• 14Arthur A. Ekirch, Jr., Ideologies and Utopias, The Impact of the New Deal on American Thought (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1969), pp. 46, 114, 208-213; Robert A. Divine, The Illusion of Neutrality (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1968), pp. 286-335; James J. Martin, “On the ‘Defense’ Origins of the New Imperialism,” Rampart Journal, Vol. IV, 3, pp. 25-27.
• 15Gabriel Kolko, The Politics of War, The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1943-1945 (New York: Random House, 1968), pp. 242-340; William L. Neumann, After Victory (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), pp. 127-189.
• 16Kolko, op. cit., pp. 549-617; James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York: Harper & Bros., 1947), pp. 138-155.
• 17Kolko, op. cit., pp. 484-502.
• 18Ibid., pp. 163-164, 418; Barnet, Intervention and Revolution, pp. 89-91; George F. Kennan, Memoirs (Boston: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1967), pp. 227-284.
• 20Joseph M. Jones, The Fifteen Weeks (New York: Viking, 1964), pp. 5-7, 120-121, 189; G. William Domhoff, “Who Made American Foreign Policy, 1945-1963?” in David Horowitz, ed., Corporations and the Cold War (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969), pp. 25-64; Arthur A. Ekirch, Jr., The Civilian and the Military (New York: Oxford, 1956), pp. 273-275.
• 21Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, pp. 298-305; Barnet, Intervention and Revolution, pp. 97-104.
• 22Barnet, op. cit., pp. 107-128; Todd Gitlin, “Counter-Insurgency: Myth and Reality in Greece,” in David Horowitz, ed., Containment and Revolution, pp. 140–180.
• 23Jones, op. cit., p. 177; L. K. Adler and T. G. Paterson, “Red Fascism: The Merger of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia in the American Image of Totalitarianism, 1930s–1950s,” American Historical Review, LXXV (1970), pp. 1046-1064.
• 24Henry A. Wallace, “The Way to Help Greece,” New Republic, CXVI (March 17, 1947), pp. 12-13; Wallace, “The Fight for Peace Begins,” New Republic, CXVI (March 24, 1947), pp. 12-13; Lloyd C. Gardner, “The New Deal, New Frontiers, and the Cold War,” in David Horowitz, ed., Corporations and the Cold War, pp. 126-135.
• 25Congressional Record, 80th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 2831-2832.
• 26Congressional Record, 80th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 3350-3354, 6562-6563.
• 27Jones, op. cit., pp. 31-35, 118-119; Lloyd C. Gardner, Architects of Illusion (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970), pp. 270-290.
• 28Kennan, op. cit., pp. 332-334; Jones, op. cit., pp. 132-133, 154-155; Gardner, op. cit., pp. 281-300.
• 29Jones, op. cit., pp. 252-253, 278-281; Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York: Norton, 1969), pp. 227-235; Kennan, op. cit , pp. 342-343; Gardner, op. cit., pp. 215-231.
• 30Barnet, op. cit., pp. 97-121.
• 31Ibid., pp. 181-236.
• 32McGeorge Bundy, The Pattern of Responsibility (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1952), pp. 83-89; Bundy, “’Appeasement,’ ‘Provocation,’ and Policy,” The Reporter (January 9, 1951), pp. 14-16.
• 33Bundy, “The Private World of Robert Taft,” The Reporter (December 11, 1951), pp. 37-38.
• 34New Republic (January 15, 1951), p. 7; Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 1st sess., p. 55.
• 35Vital Speeches, 19 (June 15, 1953), pp. 530-531.
• 36McGeorge Bundy, “The End of Either/Or,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 45, 2 (January 1967), pp. 189-201; Bundy, “To Cap the Volcano,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 48, 1 (October 1969), pp. 10-18.
• 37The New York Times, January 5, 1969, p. 14.
• 38The New York Times, June 5, 1969, p. 30.