When used properly, and when restrained by the prevalence of a relatively laissez-faire ideology, democracy can indeed work as a brake on government power. Like Claudio Grass — who believes that Switzerland employs elections relatively well in the service of hobbling government power — I agree this can be done. Indeed, at the state and local level in the US, it has been done to a certain extent, as in the case of the Taxpayer’s Bill of Rights in Colorado, which requires voter approval of tax increases.
In a recent article at LewRockwell.com, Grass, examines the historical origins of two highly-decentralized states, Switzerland and (pre-1980s) Lebanon.
The general thrust of the piece is that the power of states can be limited if states are comprised on competing and conflicting jurisdictions, whether they be cantons in the case of Switzerland, or ethno-religious enclaves as in the case of Lebanon. (As with many other political systems, however, outside intervention in Lebanon de-stabilized the system.)
But let’s focus on Switzerland since it is the example that has lasted the longest and is still extant. Grass notes that Swiss politics is dominated by a preference for local control and suspicion (relatively speaking) of the central government. This in turn is reinforced by political institutions that provide a fairly large amount of political power at the local level compared to the national level. Specifically, he mentions the traditions of plebiscitary democracy that can provide for a veto on national law.
Grass doesn’t mention the concept by name, but he’s likely also referring to Switzerland’s tradition of “double majorities” which, generally speaking requires that not only a majority of the voting population approve of a government initiative, but also that a majority of member cantons/states/municipalities approve.
Let’s imagine a “double majority” case in the context of the American states. Say, for example, that in order to pass a tax increase, it would be necessary to get a majority vote from Congress and also from a majority of voters in a majority of states. Thus, every tax increase would require majority votes from the voters in 26 states.
How easy might it be to pass tax increases if such a situation were mandated? I’d guess it would be rather more difficult. Moreover, such a system is thoroughly anti-majoritarian in that it lessens the power of the more populous regions relative to less populous regions. A straight popular vote greatly favors the large and populous states. On the other hand, in a system of double majorities, New York and California might find themselves begging South Dakota and Montana voters for their support in passing national laws.
Obviously, such a system would look considerably different from the one we have now, and would emphasize the role of more local government institutions in making national policy.
