On September 5th, Reason Magazine published a very strange assessment of the war in Ukraine, written by Paul Schwennesen, titled “The War in Ukraine Is Already Over—Russia Just Doesn’t Know it Yet.” In short, Schwennesen argues that, based on his experience recently traveling to the front in Kursk Oblast, Ukrainian will and high morale mean that the war is as good as over and that Ukrainian triumph is “inevitable.”
Schwennesen’s analysis that Russia has as good as lost the war and that its conclusion might very well lead to a collapse of the Russian Federation rests on the premise that the material factors of war do not matter, and that, “A war’s end, after all, is a matter of will, of spirit” and, “Wars are won in the heart of a people, not through the rational calculations of military planners.”
Schwennesen goes on and on about the high morale of the Ukrainian troops he witnessed in Kursk and contrastes this with what he characterizes as the absence of morale and active resistance among the Russian civilians he encountered. This leads him to conclude that the Russians are lacking the will to fight and will, therefore, be defeated. Yet, his junket to Ukraine (complete with what is likely a Ukrainian PR handler he calls his “comrade”) notwithstanding, the vast majority of evidence points in exactly the opposite direction when it comes to morale and the will to fight.
As John Mearsheimer explained at the beginning of 2023, the War in Ukraine turned into a war of attrition. The three main factors in a war of attrition are the balance of artillery, the balance of population, and the balance of resolve. Schwennesen seems to think that silly things like artillery and population don’t matter, but they are overwhelmingly on the side of Russia. This leaves the balance of resolve, which Schwennesen places entirely on the side of Ukraine. However, vast amounts of evidence contradict this also.
To begin with, one must consider why the war started. If one thinks that Puin invaded Ukraine on a whim with the intent to rebuild the Soviet Empire for his own personal aggrandizement, then one might think that there is little at stake on the Russian side of the fight. Yet, the picture looks entirely different if one concludes that the Russians believe that Ukrainian alignment with the West, specifically increased integration with NATO, is viewed as an existential threat that cannot be tolerated, then the stakes appear to be much higher.
Then-ambassador to Russia and now head of the CIA, William Burns noted all the way back in 2008, in the wake of the Bucharest NATO summit where Ukraine and Georgia were promised eventual membership, that such a thing would be unacceptable to the Russians. John Mearsheimer presciently laid out the Russian reaction to the situation back in 2014. The former British ambassador to Russia also echoed similar sentiments. Such a perceived existential threat would naturally lead to a strong resolve.
But aside from such imputation of motives, how has Russian society actually responded to the war? One of the clearest indicators is recruitment levels. According to Russian accounts, recruitment has been sky high since the start of 2023. Then Russian Minister of Defense Shoigu reported in December of 2023 that there had been 490,000 recruits since the start of the year. Recruitment in 2024 seems to be similarly vigorous, with a reported 190,000 recruits in the first half of the year.
Even if one were to make allowances for Russian exaggeration (though at least for 2024 the figures align with aspects of the Russian budget) the fact remains that Russia has not instituted another round of calling up reserves after the first round in late 2022. This is even with the reportedly high casualties from Russian offenses along the front.
This strong recruitment implies that a significant number of Russians believe that this war is worth fighting, likely because they perceive the expansion of NATO to the traditional highway to invade Russia as being an existential threat. (Not to mention the glee with which people like Schwennesen drool over the thought of breaking Russia apart, which is laughable in light of the fact that there is a Russian ethnic majority in nearly every oblast and region).
Meanwhile, Russian opposition media, The Bell, reports that Russian society has been largely unfazed by the incursion into Kursk or the war in general. In an interview, opposition Russian sociologist Alexey Levinson stated that, “I do not know what purpose the Ukrainian command was, but if the task was to show what a real war is on your land and thereby cause a shock in Russian society, then this goal was not achieved.” He later went on to say,
External observers are surprised: how does Moscow look like Rio de Janeiro during the carnival—with music, dance and holidays? Why do people seem joyful and carefree? We expect to see the country in a state of terror and mourning because of what is happening. But that’s not the case. Society is adapting, finding ways to preserve the appearance of habitual life, despite external shocks.
In contrast, there is increasing support in Ukraine for a peace deal, even if it means ceding land to Russia. However, a majority of about 55% still favor fighting to avoid any territorial concessions. Yet, ultimately talk is cheap. One does not need to turn to alternative media to find numerous and lengthy reports about the abysmal recruiting situation in Ukraine. For months, the media has reported Ukrainian men hiding in their basements for fear of the roaming impressment gangs dragging them off the street and shipping them off to the grinding front. Others have taken to fleeing abroad, either attempting to cross the Carpathian Mountains, or swimming the Tysa River into Romania.
Last November it was reported that the average age of a Ukrainian soldier is 43 (up 8-13 years from the start of the war). Ukraine’s draft age begins at 25 (down this year from 27), which means that numerous young men are choosing not to volunteer.
These facts cast significant doubt on Schwennesen’s characterization of differing social morale, to say the least. Additionally, Schwennesen’s comments about the supposed comparative poverty of Russians to Ukrainians and the sweeping conclusions he makes based on his junket into the occupied border of Kursk Oblast is either laughably ignorant, or bald-faced propaganda depending how charitable one wants to be.
Russian GDP is 10 times that of Ukraine. Broken down on a per capita basis, the Russian figure is $13,817, compared to $5,181.40 for Ukraine. Furthermore, Kursk Oblast is roughly the size of Belgium, with a tenth of the population, nearly half of whom live in the city of Kursk itself. Schwennesen is doing the equivalent of looking at some holler in Appalachian Kentucky or West Virginia and drawing sweeping conclusions about the state of the American economy and the mood of the nation. In what amounts to a deafening silence, Schwennesen fails to mention the trade offs that were made to undertake this incursion into Kursk in the first place and the implications this has had elsewhere in the war.
Ukraine pulled many experienced units off the front lines in order to launch the offensive into Kursk, weakening defenses in the Donbass, notably around the crucial supply hub of Pokrovsk. Even Ukraine-friendly reporters and analysts have admitted with alarm the disastrous situation developing in the area. The Russian offensive in the area has accelerated and forced Ukraine to reroute experienced troops back to the area to try and hold onto the vital rail hub.
As I recently wrote in The National Interest, the Ukrainian gamble into Kursk is the result of desperation, not strength. Russia is slowly but surely grinding away through Ukrainian men and material and gaining ground as it does so. Ukraine is running out of time and its leadership knows that the odds of any sort of victory are bleak unless there is a major shake up in the strategic situation. Attacking Kursk was an attempt at such a shakeup and it has failed. It increasingly seems that the only ace in the hole left is to try and chain gang the US into the war as an active participant.
Schwennesen’s dismissal of the material and strategic aspects of warfighting is disturbing enough, but even by his own metrics of morale and “the hearts of the people,” Ukraine’s prospects look poor. Ukraine has people drowning in the river trying to escape to Romania to avoid being drafted, while Russia recruits about a thousand new troops every day. That is the reality of the situation, and delusional proclamations of imminent Ukrainian triumph in the face of overwhelming facts and evidence will help no one, least of all the long-suffering people of what is left of Ukraine.
