Damascus has fallen. After thirteen years of brutal civil war, Bashar al-Assad—who once vowed to die in Syria—has fled to Moscow, leaving behind a nation in tatters. But Syria’s next chapter may be even darker than its last.
As I wrote last year, the recent civil war in Syria, begun in 2011, was primarily a sectarian battle, always simmering but brought to a boil by the wider upheavals in the Arab world at the time and specific igniting events in Syria itself.
The sectarian context in Syria involved the rule of a minority Shi’a-Alawite family—the Assad clan—over a Sunni majority. The reasonably large (10-15 percent of the population prior to the civil war) Christian minority made for an Alawite-Christian alliance of sorts against the Sunnis. The nature of this alliance, at least nominally, was that of secularism or pluralism against the threat of Sunni fundamentalism.
Broadly for the region, Syria’s Shi’a rule meant that they were a conduit for the influence of Iran—the world’s dominant Shi’a power—in the region, providing continuity from Iran in the east, through Iraq and Syria, to Hezbollah in southern Lebanon.
With Russia providing significant power to the Assad regime, the Syrian civil war hit a stalemate around 2018, at which point the country was already a shadow of its former self. Previously a haven for Christians—like my parents who left Syria in the 1970s—millions had fled the country by that time, leaving a fragmented mess. Wide swaths of the well-populated western half of the country were nominally under Assad rule, most of the northeast was under Kurdish control, and various areas in the north were held by rebel groups.
The chaotic composition of these rebel groups has been at the heart of the situation in Syria since the beginning of the war. Initially backed by the US, these groups were, at best, a mixture of legitimate freedom fighters and hardcore jihadists, that were subject to constant shifts in alliances, goals, and regional benefactors. Ignorant of the issues at play in the country, the US provided funds and weapons that were ultimately used by a bevy of Islamist groups in the region including ISIS, al-Qaeda, and its offshoot Jabhat al-Nusra.
From this latter group come the recently “successful” Syrian rebels. Jabhat al-Nusra—originally a jihadist group with intentions of creating an Islamic state in Syria—in combination with other rebel groups formed the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (“HTS”). Loosely translated, the “organization for a free Syria.”
After several weeks of anticipatory movements and skirmishes in the northern part of the country—which were themselves preceded by years of planning and increasing military capability—HTS recently marched from the north of Syria, beginning notably with the capture of Aleppo, to the capital Damascus in a matter of days with little discernible resistance. HTS was also positioned to the south of Damascus. Primary sources cited significant public support on the ground from Syrian citizens, but it is unclear on what this support is founded aside from acceptance of the seemingly inevitable.
On the way to Damascus, HTS freed prisoners from several prisons including the most notorious, located in the mountain town of Sednaya—where I have personally visited on many occasions—outside of Damascus. For those familiar with the brutal history of Syria’s Mukhabarat—Syrian military intelligence—the release of prisoners from Sednaya and others contains powerful symbolism.
Primary sources also report rooftop snipers were posted at the central bank of Syria, as the Assad family looted the country for the last time prior to their exit. Thus, a stark reminder of the enduring relationship between a ruling regime’s inevitable plunder and its enabling central bank.
That HTS was able to complete their route to the capital so easily was undoubtedly a function of two other wars in the region, and the effects thereof. Recall that Syria’s primary defense support during the civil war—and the primary reason Assad was still in power—was Russia. Bogged down in Ukraine, Russia likely could not spare the necessary resources any longer. By the same token, Hezbollah in southern Lebanon has had intense battles recently with Israel, leaving the other primary Shi’a power in the region somewhat neutered. As keen observers are aware, the Syrian army on its own is a non-entity, and essentially dissolved as HTS cut a swath through the country.
From a branding perspective, HTS has somehow been able to present themselves as a group of secular and earnest freedom fighters. Comprising various groups of Islamists, this should strike reasonable observers as hardly credible. The more believable story is that HTS is explicitly or implicitly funded and supported by various regional and global powers—including the US and Turkey—and the branding was therefore required for political reasons.
The harsh reality is that Syria has traded one evil for another. A country that once achieved stasis under a secular, but tyrannical, family is now under the control of an Islamist junta. A democratic vote is likely years away, for what that’s worth.
In the meantime, the drastic power shift in Syria means that a resurgence of ISIS is underway and the obnoxious geopolitical calculations of regional and global powers are being re-calibrated, with the US and Israel already taking significant action, in keeping with their opportunistic natures. What this series of events means for Syria and its people is anybody’s guess, but the replacement of the Assad family by an Islamist group with good public relations should not fool anyone. The future of Syria does not look bright.
