The Sociology of Panics and Crashes in American History
Boom, Bust, and the Future (19:39) January 18-19, 2002
Boom, Bust, and the Future (19:39) January 18-19, 2002
Recorded at the 2003 Supporters Summit: Prosperty, War, and Depression.
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Recorded at the 2003 Supporters Summit: Prosperty, War, and Depression.(16:52)
Like the children of Lake Wobegon, writes Robert Blumen, many investors in the 1990s believed that stock market returns would always be above average. They were proven wrong. But Greenspan and many others advance a slightly different justification for the bubble: the efficient markets hypothesis, which argues that the current price, whatever it is and even when pump up by credit expansion, is the best of all possible worlds.
The answer is no, says Joseph Salerno. The Fed's performance has been astoundingly bad throughout Greenspan's tenure as Chairman. Perhaps worse, Greenspan has been a relentless purveyor of economic fallacies designed to obscure and justify this egregious performance. However, his departure from the stage might not be cause for unalloyed joy among proponents of sound money—Ben Bernanke could be lurking in the wings.
Morgan Reynolds: "When the Bush administration took office in January, 2001, a downturn was already underway. The president and his coterie said so and blamed Clinton, but then hushed up. That was a mistake—a dose of truth about the economy would have worked better—but they learned an early lesson about psychology and confidence in Washington, D.C. Politics is all about (the) confidence (game) and prestige in the nation's capital."
Britain is similar to America in that it is suffering from the same political and economic maladies that have befallen its transatlantic cousin. Indeed, faced with a burgeoning fiscal deficit, fiat money-precipitated economic imbalances and renewed imperialism, albeit at Washington's behest, the U.K.'s own variant of "War, Prosperity and Depression," underscores the sources of America's woes. Grant Nülle explains.
It's easy to be depressed when you look around and see the state of monetary affairs, writes Christopher Mayer. But as many historical vignettes show, we have one great force in our favor. The inability of governments to maintain fixed exchange rates in the face of opposing market forces is proof of the impotency government managers.