The Anatomy of Antitrust: An Interview with Dominick T. Armentano
Volume 18, Number 3 (Fall 1998)
An Interview With Dominick T. Armentano
This article provides a new synthesis between the strategic management literature and Austrian capital theory. The resource allocation process plays out in the context of differing subunit preferences
Using Mises’s concept of economic calculation, this paper explains why conglomerates are frequently observed in emerging economies across the world.
Cartels, characterized by activities such as simultaneous price increases or decreases, or virtual price identity at almost the same time, without explicit communications or agreements, have long been discussed.
The author explores during a lecture that all antitrust regulation is economically inefficient and morally wrong and all of it—the laws and the enforcement agencies—should be thrown out.
As every honest man knows, crime doesn’t pay. Our main problem is that apparently no one has yet told the criminals.
The inflation which seems to have become endemic to much of the world, along with the perception that the prime culprits are the monopolistic issue
Given the temper of the times it was surprising that following the American Revolution there appeared proposals for national systems of education.
Most economists would, given the opportunity, offer some proposal to reform antitrust policy. Some would contend that this or that aspect of antitrust law should be eliminated or more weakly enforced.
In almost every discussion of the FCC specifically, or American spectrum policy in general, someone will assert that radio spectrum is a unique res